Article 9 and Japan’s Missile Defense Dilemma

After North Korea’s recent missile tests over Japan, new questions have been raised about the ‘pacifist clause’ of the Japanese Constitution and the effectiveness of Japan’s missile defense strategy. How could Shinzo Abe respond?
Just as it seemed like tensions in the Korean peninsula could not get any higher, North Korea decided to launch the Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) over the Japanese island of Hokkaido. This was the fourteenth test of a ballistic missile conducted by North Korea in 2017 – leaving the country with nine operational ballistic missiles, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Of these nine missiles, only the No-Dong has Japan within its optimal firing range of between 1,200-1,500 kilometers. Given that Tokyo is a mere 1285 kilometers from Pyongyang, this is the missile that is likely to keep the Japanese Self-Defence Force on its toes.
Japan’s Self-Defense Legislation
At present, Japan’s missile defense strategy against North Korea is focussed on ensuring a successful interception of the No-Dong medium-range ballistic missile. In fact, it may be the only North Korean missile Japan’s Self-Defence Force can intercept under domestic law. The reason for this lies in the Japanese Constitution. Written in the aftermath of World War II, Article 9 stipulates that ‘Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.’ In this sense, the Japanese Self-Defence Force is only allowed to defend against a foreign attack. This means that Japan can only intercept missiles that are due to land in its territory. Any other missile cannot be intercepted as it would constitute a ‘use of force as means of settling international disputes’ that do not explicitly involve Japan. That is why Japan’s missile defenses are based upon interception of the No-Dong.

This post was published at FinancialSense on 10/06/2017.